Executive Summary:
• Russia has, once again, allied with China in seeking to restrain international condemnation of North Korea’s violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718.
• Russia’s commitment to this more restrained diplomatic approach is partly based on the erroneous belief that it has a degree of influence over Kim Jong Il and his regime. Influence which, whilst not as a great as China, is still stronger than other members of the six-party talks (Japan, America and South Korea). The persistence of this erroneous belief can be better understood by taking into account the history of Russian-North Korean relations over the last twenty years
• Yet today, following President Medvedev’s proposed commitment to renewing START negotiations this year, a reluctance to forge a common stance with America against such a blatant violator of non-proliferation norms, undermines Russia’s commitment to address the problem of nuclear proliferation.
• Russia must confront the reality that it has no genuine leverage over Kim Jong Il; only China does, and even this is limited. Russia needs to see that real progress can be made in addressing the dangers of nuclear proliferation, if it becomes more open to the idea of forging a stronger stance on North Korea in tandem with America.
Russia’s reaction to North Korea’s launch of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile on 5th April came in the form of the following statement by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: the ‘international community need to demonstrate a balanced approach and caution.’ This sat in contrast to the response given by US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, that: ‘The United States’ view is this is serious, it’s a violation and it merits an appropriately strong United Nations response.’ Similarly when the UN Security Council met in an emergency meeting to discuss the matter on the 13th April, Russia (along with China) was, according to Russian media, urging restraint due to the fact that Resolution 1718 does not prohibit the launch of satellites. If this information is correct than it means that six days after the Taepodong-2 launch, Russia was reluctant to condemn this blatant violation of international law, on the basis that the North Korean claim that they were not test firing a ballistic missile but placing a satellite into orbit to transmit ‘revolutionary songs’, was factual.
Subsequent to Russia’s distinct reluctance to publicly condemn North Korea’s actions outright, when the North Korean regime announced on the 14th April that it was withdrawing from the six-party talks and restarting its nuclear programme, the Russian response came in three stages. Firstly, an unnamed Foreign Ministry official expressed their ‘regret’ at North Korea’s decision and called on it ‘not to leave the six party talks on the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula’. Secondly, an official statement was released by the Foreign Ministry which called on North Korea ‘to fulfil Security Council Resolution 1718’ [which calls for an end to the conducting of nuclear tests and/or ballistic missile tests or launches], and urged it to ‘return to the negotiating table’. Thirdly, Foreign Minister Lavrov sought to calm tension by expressing confidence that six-party talks would continue and stating further that ‘there is no need to establish a new international forum to address the situation on the Korean Peninsula.’ Russia’s actions follow a pattern of protecting the dictatorial regime which was also present during 2004. In May of that year Russia agreed to support the Bush Administration’s ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’ resolution in the Security Council, but only in return for the removal of a specific reference that cited North Korea as a violator of the NPT.
What is evident from Russia’s statements and actions is that when it comes to North Korea there is little appetite for tougher sanctions, harsher condemnation, or deviation from the intransigent position in the Security Council that has been the hallmark of Russian policy. Russia believes that unlike Japan, America and South Korea, it is well placed to influence Kim Jong Il, and move the dictator towards denuclearization and more rational behaviour. This belief is predicated on the fact that Russia is a former cold war ally, a regional power, possesses a degree of independence from American influence that countries like Japan and South Korea do not, and has a shared border. In short, Russia believes it is an honest broker.
Russian policy since the start of Vladimir Putin’s presidency in 2000 has been a reaction against President Yeltsin’s apathy towards North Korea during the 1990s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia orientated its foreign policy towards the development of a trading relationship with South Korea at the expense of the North. Russia also acquiesced in American proposed sanctions following North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 1993. However, this lack of interest in forging a relationship with North Korea was shaken by the 1998 test firing of a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile. Russia believed the price of ignoring Kim Jong Il was too high to pay now he had revealed his intention to acquire a nuclear arsenal with delivery capability. A process of high level diplomacy began in 2000. Firstly, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Pyongyang in February 2000, followed by President Putin in July of that year. A ‘Friendship Treaty’ was signed to replace the ‘Mutual Assistance Treaty’, which was a defunct relic of the Cold War that had been allowed to expire in 1995. The Friendship Treaty obligated both parties to resist joining a third party in actions that would compromise the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the other. Russia’s objective of manoeuvring itself into a better position from which to engage with Kim Jong Il’s regime bore success following North Korea’s decision to pull out of the NPT again in 2002. In July 2003 Russia was accepted into the multilateral framework that had been set up to address the problem alongside North Korea, South Korea, China, America and Japan, thus creating the six-party talks.
This brief overview of Russian policy towards North Korea over the last twenty years highlights the continuity of the stance that Russia has taken over current events. Russia worked to develop a relationship with Kim Jong Il and to gain acceptance into the multi-party talks in the belief that its lack of attention to the problem in the 1990s was a contributory factor in the behaviour of the neo-Stalinist regime, and that only once it had gained access to the heart of the regime could it work at changing North Korea’s policies.
However, it is now time for Russia to realise that it possesses no leverage over North Korea, and that the diplomatic cover it provides for Kim Jong Il in the Security Council is wasted. The Russian attitude is particularly exposed now – and therefore potentially open to alteration – because of the difficulty posed by reconciling its stance on North Korea with the recent meeting between Presidents Medvedev and Obama in London. At this meeting President Medvedev pledged to reengage in the START process with a view to achieving further bilateral reductions in strategic weapons. But Russia’s reluctance to accept tougher sanctions on North Korea for its blatant rule-breaking sends out a conflicting signal to the pledge to cut its nuclear arsenal. How can Russia lead the way in addressing the dangers of nuclear proliferation when it continues to block firm and effective resolutions in the UN against one of the most blatant proliferators? Russia must seriously consider two key issues: (1) The danger posed to Russian territory by an errant North Korean missile (2) The broader threat to the integrity of non-proliferation norms if North Korea is allowed to behave in this way and be protected diplomatically at the UN.
An argument often put forward to explain Russian reticence towards harsh sanctions on the North Korean regime is the destabilizing effect these sanctions might have, to the extent that the regime might collapse, causing a humanitarian crisis in the region. This is an understandable concern, but South Korea has far more to be concerned about this eventuality, yet President Lee Myung-bak has been firm in his insistence since 2008 that any further aid from Seoul to the North is conditional on progress in six-party talks. Similarly Russia’s belief that it has a degree of influence over North Korean policy, akin to China, is misplaced. On a recent visit to Beijing Kim Jong Il was greeted by President Hu Jintao’s proclamation that the countries friendship ‘has become [the] common treasure of both nations.’ In contrast there is neither similar rhetoric nor closeness between Russia and North Korea.
The argument put forward here is not that Russia is willing to accept the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, with all the attendant risks of an arms race potentially drawing in Japan that this would bring. Nor is it to suggest that a focus on the six-party talks as expressed by the Russian Foreign Ministry is misguided and a military option should now be pursued. What is increasingly apparent is that Russia steadfastly allies with China in the Security Council to prevent the development of a firm consensus on tougher sanctions towards Kim Jong Il’s regime. Simultaneously it appears clear that since the renewal of the Russian-North Korean relationship in 2000, North Korea’s desire to challenge international norms on non-proliferation has not declined. North Korea pulled out of the NPT in 2002 and claimed to have tested a nuclear device in 2006. North Korea’s current actions suggest that its 2008 commitment to close down the Yongbyon nuclear facility in return for aid may have been only a short term ploy. Russian private pressure has not assuaged the threat posed by North Korea to East-Asian security.
Russia’s recent move toward reengaging with America to reduce nuclear stockpiles is promising. North Korea’s latest actions should present an opportunity for genuine Russian reflection on how fruitful their policy of intransigence in the Security Council on behalf of this despotic regime has actually been. Considering the lack of leverage President Medvedev actually has over Kim Jong Il, it is surelythe case that diverging approaches on this issue represent a pointless area of disagreement for America and Russia. Section 3.3 of the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation reaffirms Russia’s ‘unfailing policy of developing multilateral foundations of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’. The best way to act on this commitment would be for Russia to acknowledge the pointlessness of protecting Kim Jong Il. Also, at the start of this new phase in Russian-American relations, Russia should be far more willing to forge a united stance with America in the Security Council, on the regular occasions when North Korea see fit to challenge the resolve of the great powers on the issue of nuclear proliferation.
Adam Boon is an international relations analyst.