1. Russia is increasingly engaging Israel, most notably about Iran, but the outcome of such talks remains tentative
2. Russia’s history with the West, in the Middle East, and with Israel in particular casts doubt on real progress
3. A considerable amount of work will need to done by Russia over time to demonstrate that it is serious about reforming relations
4. The likelihood of any fundamental modification in Russian policies will need to come from a sea change in its overall core geopolitical philosophy
While it is well-understood that the relationship between Russia and the modern state of Israel since its inception has been a weak and complicated one, some recent developments might suggest a modest warming. To properly anticipate whether improved relations would be a genuine possibility or whether this is simply more maneuvering by either or both parties, such talks alone must not be taken to infer a necessarily enhanced state of relations in place of a full understanding of patterns, prejudices, and practices.
Part of the reason Israel was able to move to closer relations with West Germany relatively early after World War II was because West Germany had undergone significant regime change with leaders holding views antithetical in every important respect to the regime before. Aside from an early, short-lived Soviet friendliness when the USSR hoped Israel might follow a similar socialist path in its development, as well as a later warming of relations during the post-Soviet 1990s, Soviet and Russian attitudes about Israel have not been positive. Indicative of a reversal of the post-Soviet trend, the Russia of Vladimir Putin has seen a desire to return to many facets of the Soviet era rather than evincing any epiphany that might lead to new and more peaceful interactions with other states. Consequently, all parties have seen Russian-Israeli relations deteriorate along with a Russia engaged in arming regimes that support terrorists, such as Iran which is seeking today to become a nuclear power; understatedly, a familiar reprise.
Russian relations with the US have suffered a similar fate in recent years; however, they do appear cooler, despite reset buttons, than those between Moscow and Tel Aviv at the moment. As a result, it is not surprising that the US has been unable to win any real concessions from Moscow regarding its arming of Iran. The administration of George W. Bush labored fruitlessly in precipitating any substantial movement by the Kremlin and the present outlook from Barack Obama’s administration does not proffer much improvement where it has not actually been frustrated by diplomatic missteps. However, the slightly more strained relations between the United States and Israel under President Obama may have helped to make a Russian approach to Israel more attractive.
Israel has also for some time sought to persuade Russia not to arm Iran, especially regarding its nuclear program. Recently, Israeli president Shimon Peres and Russian president Dmitri Medvedev met a few miles from the border with Abkhazia in Sochi to discuss canceling a shipment of Russian S-300 missiles which Moscow has already pledged to Iran. Medvedev agreed to review and reconsider, but little more. 1 However, if talks with Israel are seen by Russia as a useful way to step back from a potentially dangerous relationship with Iran – among other things – then it is possible that Russia and Israel might come to an agreement while saving face through not appearing to do so at the behest of the United States.
What may also be of value are the ancillary effects such talks might bring about or demonstrate for each party. Naturally, either scenario would reflect a modified Russian strategy for projecting its power in the Middle East. Russia also may find it useful to pursue a larger, perhaps more legitimate role in the region, and Israeli cooperation is one way for this to occur. 2 However, to arrive at such a newly defined role by improving relations with Israel, Russia has a considerable task ahead, particularly if it intends to appear to cooperate with Israel over Iran while not conceding too much to the Americans and not agitating its other partners.
Russia must demonstrate over time its willingness to forsake relationships that hinder its ability to build lasting legitimacy as a trustworthy interlocutor and participant in the region. The Soviet Union during the Cold War and Russia today have for the most part maintained a foreign policy that is unfriendly toward Israel, not only through its forging alliances with former non-state elements in the region once allied to Nazi Germany, but also with states such as Egypt and Syria while they were at war with Israel. Russia’s past involvement with Hezbollah*, with which there may even exist a more direct relationship dating back to the 1970s – and support for groups like Abu Nidal through East Germany, the leftist PFLP, and others – was historically quite problematic for Israel. 3, 4, 5 Russia’s present “trickle-down” of weapons usually through Iran and Syria to terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas – which Russia does not recognize as terrorist groups and is “openly engaging” – will prove a significant but not impossible hurtle to cross, depending on the course chosen by Moscow. 6, 7, 8 Thus rests much of the hope of genuinely improved relations.
Russia has also struggled internally with anti-Semitism for nearly a thousand years. Aside from the countless pogroms in its past, the Soviet Union has, in more recent history, resisted immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel whose release was not realized until negotiated by President Reagan as a condition of progress in strategic talks. Evidence today suggests that anti-Semitism has been on the rise in Europe and particularly in Russia over the last few years. 9, 10 It certainly would not harm Russian relations with Israel today by proactively working to stamp out long-standing cultural anti-Semitism within its borders.
On the diplomatic front, Moscow has historically also had the tendency of engaging with other governments in talks over significant concerns but either failing to arrive at agreements involving concessions of mutual value or failing to follow through on agreements with appropriate action. In so doing, it becomes increasingly less likely that other states will show real interest in engaging Russia in talks, since talking would have become devalued. Russia should work to enhance its credibility by working in good faith and keeping the commitments it makes. Another possible diplomatic concern, which could make negotiating with Dmitri Medvedev more fruitful than with Vladimir Putin is that Mr. Putin was stationed in East Germany* as a KGB officer while the GDR supported unsavory Middle Eastern elements and was the strongest voice calling for neo-Soviet revanchism as president of Russia. 11 Irrespective of Mr. Putin’s role in East Germany, perception is an important part of diplomacy.
Fortunately, there are already examples of recent cooperation between Tel Aviv and Moscow, but any agreement by Moscow not to abet Iran’s nuclear program would be the most significant. Trade and other areas in which Russia and Israel work together have been improving and may also provide a helpful backdrop to more important developments, if Russia should so choose. Russia stands not only to gain a greater sense of legitimacy from thoughtful cooperation with Israel, it could also benefit from what such a stronger relationship could mean; namely, driving a small but not insignificant wedge between the US and Israel, as it did when Israel was considering selling sensitive UAV technology to Russia in 2008. 12 Certainly this could be used – as the regime tends to with important talks – to make agreements it has no intention of keeping. A more positive alternative, however, could be that Moscow finds a back door to improved relations with Washington over Iran while saving face by acceding to what Washington wants but doing so through Israeli talks.
Will present talks with Israel eventually lead to Russian reformation in the Middle East far down the road? This appears not very likely. Russia will probably seek backdoor access to Washington, but will probably also continue working at some level to separate the US from its allies and pursue other contrarian initiatives in the region. Ultimately, any real improvements will depend on Russia’s willingness to reformulate its current worldview, which has worsened since the dawn of the Putin era. Russia’s enchantment with its Soviet and imperial past – including the revival of strategic allies in the Middle East and elsewhere around the world – has not only led to the disintegration of relations with the US and Europe, which were never especially warm, but with Israel also. Russia cannot therefore be presently relied upon to interact with other states in a consistently responsible manner until the thinking that motivates Russia’s behavior is modified. In the meantime, understanding what motivates Russia will continue to aid in the anticipation of its future actions more than the agreements it makes.
What may keep Russia at the table with Israel for the moment is the reality that a nuclear Iran may one day prove disastrous for Russia indirectly, if not directly. This, at least, is what it is hoped that Russia realizes. Yet, it remains unlikely that Russia will bring itself to cooperate with the United States on Iran, even if in its own interest it should do so, which means that Israel may provide an attractive alternative.
* *KGB archives taken by Vasili Mitrokhin from the KGB headquarters at Lubyanka reveal significant East German terrorist ties during the 1970s and 1980s. For example, former East German interior minister Peter-Michael Diestel referred to the GDR “as an Eldorado of terrorists” and the Soviets used East Germany to directly support groups, including PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) to attack Israel. The East German RAF (Red Army Faction), Stasi secret police, and Libya were also complicit in the bombing of La Belle Discothèque in West Berlin in 1986. The KGB even planned its own direct terrorist campaign, but never followed through (Operation RYAN). 15
Martin Kite-Powell is an Research Assistant with the Henry Jackson Society
2. Israel: Peres Says Russia Will Help Prevent Violence In Middle East. (2009, August 18). Retrieved from Stratfor: http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20090818_israel_peres_says_russia_will_help_prevent_violence_middle_east
3. Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin (2001). The Sword And The Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and The Secret History of The KGB. (pp. 379-382, 392). New York: Basic Books.
4. CIA. (1986, August 01). The Soviet Bloc Role and International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence. Retrieved from Faqs.org: http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/22/0000518060/THE-SOVIET-BLOC-ROLE-AND-INTERNATIONAL-TERRORISM-AND-REVOLUTIONARY-VIOLENCE-%28KE.html
5. PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Palestinian leftists. (2005, October 31). Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9128/
6. Russia, Iran: Anti-Aircraft Missile Deal Will Be Reviewed - Medvedev. (2009, August 19). Retrieved from Stratfor: http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20090819_russia_iran_anti_aircraft_missile_deal_will_be_reviewed_medvedev
7. Briefly: Russia lists terrorists, leaving off Hezbollah. (No Date Given). Retrieved from New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/world/europe/28iht-briefs.2325634.html
8. Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. (2009, March 12). How the Obama Administration Should Deal with Russia's Revisionist Foreign Policy. Retrieved from The Heritage Foundation: http://www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/bg2246.cfm
9. Growing Anti-Semitism in Russia. (2001). Retrieved from The Anti-Defamation League: http://www.adl.org/russia/russian_political_antisemitism_3.asp
10. Anti-Semitism in Russia: 2008. (2009, January). Retrieved from NCSJ: http://www.ncsj.org/documents/012909NCSJ_Russia_A-S.pdf
11. Profile: Vladimir Putin. (2008, May 06). Retrieved from The BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/667749.stm
12. Melman, Yossi. (2008, November 17). Russia expected to buy Israeli UAVs. Retrieved from Haaretz: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1037542.html
13. Sorin, Alex. (2009, July 23). The Caracas Connection. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1248277866063&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
14. The Associated Press. (2009, May 25). Secret document: Venezuela, Bolivia supplying Iran with uranium . Retrieved from Haaretz: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1088087.html
15. Andrew, Mitrokhin. The Sword And The Shield. (pp. 392).