Executive Summary:
- The new British government has sent out mixed messages about the length of Britain’s commitment to Afghanistan, and has suggested a desire to withdraw British forces sooner.
- General McChrystal’s recent interview with Rolling Stone magazine, and his subsequent sacking, have revealed divisions and doubts at the highest levels in the United States, and have undermined confidence in the prospects of success.
- The Taleban, by contrast, shows no sign of weakening or wavering, with a Taleban spokesman recently making it clear that the Taleban has no wish to negotiate. The Taleban also continues to receive support from Pakistan’s ISI and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.
- Obama’s suggested withdrawal date of July 2011 is putting additional strain on the NATO mission. Western political leaders need to stop suggesting withdrawal dates and deadlines, which undermine our credibility in Afghanistan and signal weakness to the Taleban.
Introduction
The war in Afghanistan has been dogged by divisions and disputes on both sides of the Atlantic. The new British government has sent out mixed messages about Britain’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan, and has indicated a goal of bringing British forces home within the next few years. Meanwhile, Barack Obama has sacked US General Stanley McChrystal, the commander in charge of ISAF forces in Afghanistan, after he made open criticisms of members of the US administration. This has undermined confidence in the Afghan mission, which has hanging over it an increasingly close deadline of July 2011, when Obama is hoping to begin to withdraw US forces.
Mixed messages from the new British government
New prime minister David Cameron has insisted that the war in Afghanistan is his “number one priority”. Welcoming Afghan president Hamid Karzai to Chequers, Cameron reassured him that Afghanistan was “our top priority in foreign affairs”.
Yet very soon the new government became embroiled in an internal row over the nature and purpose of Britain’s mission in Afghanistan. When speaking of Britain’s military presence in Afghanistan, New defence secretary Liam Fox bluntly told the Times: “We are not in Afghanistan for the sake of the education policy in a broken 13th-century country.” This offended the Afghan government and seemed to contradict the statements of international development secretary Andrew Mitchell on supporting education there.
This relatively minor row pales in comparison to the mixed messages that have been sent out over the length and strength of Britain’s commitment to Afghanistan. David Cameron appeared to out a deadline on the deployment of British forces, telling Sky News that he wanted British troops to be home by the next general election, scheduled for 2015. He went on: "We cannot be there for another five years having effectively been there for nine years already." This was hardly an encouraging message, not least for Britain’s Afghan allies. Instead, it gave the impression that the prime minister was losing patience with Britain’s mission. Foreign secretary seemed to bring the proposed withdrawal date forward by one year, telling the BBC: “We are committed to the Afghans being able to conduct their military operations and security and that takes time. But I would be very surprised if that took longer than 2014." The most senior ministers in the Government seemed to be bidding to identify the earliest withdrawal dates, in order to satisfy the public desire to bring the troops home.
Yet defence secretary Liam Fox once again delivered a different message. In a speech to the Heritage Foundation in Washington DC, he called for “strategic patience” from the United Kingdom and the United States. He warned that if NATO forces were to "leave prematurely", "we would probably see the return of the destructive forces of trans-national terror" and would "risk the destabilisation of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences." He went on to warn that leaving before the mission was complete "would be a shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere, re-energising violent radical and extreme Islamism. It would send the signal that we did not have the morale resolve and political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a national security imperative. Premature withdrawal would also damage the credibility of NATO which has been the cornerstone of the defence of the West for more than half a century. To leave before the job is finished would leave us less safe and less secure. Our resolve would be called into question, our cohesion weakened, and the Alliance undermined. It would be a betrayal of all the sacrifices made by our Armed Forces in life and limb." This was a very forceful warning, which displayed none of the prime minister’s impatience to bring the deployment in Afghanistan to an end. Instead, he said that the British and US governments must 'see the job through' and resist succumbing to a 'natural impatience' to get the troops home. He urged patience with the new strategy in Afghanistan, saying: "We've got to give the strategy time to work on the ground without constantly trying to change and question it. We can't pull a plant up every day to look at its roots to see how it is growing" And, in contrast to the statements of Cameron and Hague, Fox suggested that British forces would be among the last to leave Afghanistan, telling the BBC: "The likelihood is that it will be one of the last parts to transition over to Afghan charge. The mission in Helmand is one of the most difficult ones and I imagine one of the last places they will be able to transition from."
This caused controversy within the Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition, with former Liberal Democrat leader Sir Menzies Campbell saying that Liam Fox’s “intervention was unhelpful, indeed the government thought it was unhelpful. It would have been better if these remarks had not been made.” However, political commentators have argued that the main division is not between Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, but between the prime minister and other Conservatives, such as Fox, who want to take a more ‘hawkish’ approach to international affairs.
The apparent contradiction between the prime minister and the defence secretary drew criticism from the former chief of the defence staff Lord Guthrie, who commented: "The Army doesn't want a government that dithers. Soldiers in the field need to know the Government is totally supportive of what they're trying to do - and a mixed message is not helpful." The opposition has also been understandably critical, with acting Labour leader Harriet Harman warning Cameron that "setting artificial time scales is a very dangerous game to play." Shadow foreign secretary David Miliband also argued that any "artificial" deadline for withdrawal would give "false hope to the British people and would give a false message to the insurgency.” He continued: “We must be clear, it's essential in a war that government provides clear leadership. We must say that the worst thing to do would be to leave, only to have to send our troops back - that is the absolute worst thing. We should be clear that we must ensure Afghanistan is not again going to become the incubator of international terrorism."
These criticisms are fair. The new government, while promising a new sense of urgency and purpose in Afghanistan, has created the impression of a confused and uncertain commitment to Afghanistan, with arbitrary withdrawal dates of 2014 or 2015 being suggested. While the government insists that these are not deadlines, the government knows that when these dates are mentioned in interviews, they create an expectation that withdrawal should happen at that time. Such dates also send a message to British forces that their time is limited and their mission uncertain. More worryingly, they also send our Afghan allies and Afghan civilians the message that our commitment will be over in a few years time, while sending our enemies the message that we are not going to fight on against them for much longer, so if they are patient, they will be able to take over once we have left. Professor Michael Clarke of the Royal United Services Institute recently argued that if we commit our forces indefinitely, they will be able to succeed and come home sooner, whereas to set a withdrawal date is to invite certain defeat.
The changes in the US leadership of the Afghan campaign
A much greater problem for the overall Afghan campaign than the mixed messages from the British government has been the sacking of General McChrystal as the commander in charge of the US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. He was forced to resign after a series of interviews with a reporter from Rolling Stone magazine in which he and his aides were openly and heavily critical of senior figures in the Obama administration. An aide of McChrystal's describes Obama's first meeting with McChrystal as "a 10-minute photo op. Obama clearly didn't know anything about him... The Boss was pretty disappointed." Speaking of the period when Obama was reviewing Afghanistan policy after McChrystal had called for more troops, McChrystal tells the interviewer: “"I found that time painful. I was selling an unsellable position." When the interviewer asks McChrystal about vice president Joe Biden, McChrystal jokes: "Who's that?" When receiving an e-mail from Obama's envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, McChrystal complains: "Oh, not another e-mail from Holbrooke. I don't even want to open it." He complains of visiting US politicians interfering, and states that he felt "betrayed" when a cable written by US ambassador Karl Eikenberry criticising McChrystal's strategy and Afghan president Hamid Karzai was leaked to the New York Times. Another aide went so far as to described the "wimps in the White House" as the main threat to the success of the Afghan mission.
Although Barack Obama has insisted that McChrystal’s departure and replacement with General David Petraeus “is a change in personnel but not a change in policy," his exit is highly damaging. It is not only McChrystal’s interview revealed such division and ill-feeling between the military and the government. McChrystal was the man who devised and was leading the new counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan; a strategy that was, in a very real sense, his. For this reason, McChrystal had a high profile in the media and was closely associated in the public mind with the Afghan mission. As well as this, McChrystal had a strong working relationship with Hamid Karzai, one which was much less strained that Karzai’s relations with US diplomats and politicians. He also built strong personal relationships and a significant degree of trust with Afghan tribal leaders and religious elders, while also making efforts to promote the idea of respect for Afghans' Islamic culture and tradition, as part of the battle for ‘hearts and minds’. He had become popular with Afghans, who did not wish to see him go.
The Taleban obviously sought to extract the maximum propaganda advantage from McChrystal’s sacking. The Taleban swiftly issued a statement saying: "Although U.S. officials say that McChrystal was fired because of his comments, in fact, the move proves the failure of Barack Obama's strategy... Nine years of military actions, different strategies and back-breaking monetary and life damages at the hands of mujahedeen have left the crusaders totally in distress." Taleban spokesman Qari Muhammad Yousuf Ahmadi described McCrystal's sacking as "a hidden help from Allah the Almighty, besides the bravery and sacrifices of our fearless Mujahideen which made the enemy armies bow down," adding: "Obama wants to save his and his party’s face. But Obama will never be successful as the change of generals will not work because the Afghans have already won this long war." He claimed that it was the Taleban's recent 'Al-Fatah Operation' that led to the firing. Ahmadi went on to make the usual historical comparisons, saying: "History is evident of more powerful and experienced generals than General McChrystal and empires mightier than the United States of America being surrendered and bowed down before the Afghans. Afghanistan is called the graveyard of superpowers... No matter how many policies they make or [how many times they] change their generals, the U.S. and NATO have no alternative except to bow down before the principled stance of Ameer-ul-Momineen (Leader of the Faithful) Mullah Omar… Afghanistan is the home of Afghan masses, and no peace can be restored until an Islamic government is set up according to the wishes of Afghans and all the occupation forces leave Afghanistan."
The Taleban was also keen to pour scorn on the appointment of General Petraeus, saying: "General Petraeus, being witness to the incidents in Afghanistan is the only person who realizes the gravity of the situation and described this situation well by falling unconscious." Ahmadi added: "The appointment of General Petraeus will have no outcome in favour of the occupation forces as he has already been involved in all decision making regarding Afghanistan as the Chief of the Central Command in the past. Indeed, he has got no more special qualities than General McChrystal had. His falling down due to stress during the Congressional session about Afghanistan last week has left a big question mark on his physical and mental health."
Yet, in the US and among NATO allies, the choice of Petraeus to replace McChrystal was greeted with relief. Petraeus, as McChrystal’s superior in his post as head of the US Central Command, and with his record of implementing the successful ‘strategy’ in Iraq ( a war which was widely written off as a lost cause at the time), seemed the obvious and best choice. The choice of Petraeus also reassured the Afghan government.
The mission on a knife edge
Petraeus has taken over at a highly challenging time for the campaign in Afghanistan. One of the other things revealed in the Rolling Stone interview was the sense among McChrystal and his aides that the strategy in Afghanistan was not going as well as been hoped. McChrystal openly stated that while he did not believe that the Taleban had the momentum, “neither do we”. He described the slow and ongoing operation to retake the southern town of Marja as a "bleeding ulcer".
The idea of talking and negotiating with the Taleban has recently become popular across Western governments, and with military commanders. Yet the Taleban themselves have publicly announced that they will not negotiate with NATO, which they believe is losing the war.
Zabiullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the Afghan Taleban leadership, told the BBC: "We do not want to talk to anyone - not to Karzai, nor to any foreigners - till the foreign forces withdraw from Afghanistan. We are certain that we are winning. Why should we talk if we have the upper hand, and the foreign troops are considering withdrawal, and there are differences in the ranks of our enemies?" This indicates how talk of withdrawal dates and mixed messages are noticed by the Taleban.
The Taleban has sensed weakness. In Britain and the United States, pessimism about the war has become more prevalent, and the sense that it is a lost cause more widespread. In a recent article for the Times, Lord Ashdown, who was once considered for the role of UN envoy to Afghanistan, argued that the continued lack of a unified political strategy for Afghanistan meant that the prospect of success had become more remote, arguing: "In these kind of operations, winning militarily but losing politically mean losing. And we are losing politically. It's the insurgency that is expanding across the country not the writ of Kabul." He pointed out that political leaders had failed to adequately articulate the case for our continued efforts in Afghanistan to their electorates, allowing public support for the war in Afghanistan to drain away. He also pointed to the impact which politicians’ statements are having on the perceptions of Afghans, writing: "Nothing is altering the prevailing perception in the minds of the ordinary Afghans whose support is crucial to winning. However much we may like to deny it, they think that everyone is now heading for the door. The Netherlands is due to start pulling out its forces next month, while the Canadians have pledged to leave next summer. The United States has earmarked next July as a date for when it will begin to bring troops home, provided conditions on the ground allow for such an exit, whereas Britain has said troops will withdraw within five years... Maybe President Obama didn't quite mean what he said last year when he announced the start of the US withdrawal next summer. But words, even inadvertent ones, have a momentum of their own. Few in Afghanistan doubt the direction in which that momentum is now travelling and they are probably right. They know, even if we choose not to, that this is the beginning of the endgame in Afghanistan." In March, former NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson warned in a lecture at the Atlantic Council that NATO was "on the edge of a precipice in Afghanistan", warning that: "It is a stark fact that we could lose to the Taliban in Afghanistan and let loose the hosts and apologists of Al-Qaeda with all that means simply because governments in the NATO countries will not spell out what the high stakes are for all of us – we who will be the next target set of the extremists."
The Taleban, meanwhile, shows no sign of weakening. The neighbouring Pakistani branch of the Taleban appears to be going global, with an attempted car-bombing in New York in May. Hakimullah Mehsud, the leader of the Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan, issued a message threatening that: "the main targets of our fedayeen (fighters) are American cities. This good news will be heard within some days or weeks. Today onwards, the direction of our jihad is American states and cities. Inshallah we are successful in this mission and objective." According to Major General Gordon Messenger and to Taleban members themselves, Taleban fighters in Afghanistan are now being armed and trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. And a report from the London School of Economics argued that the Taleban was still being armed and supported by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, and that support for the Afghan Taleban was "official ISI policy". According to Taleban field commanders, the ISI is even represented on the Taleban supreme leadership council, the Quetta Shura, and on the command council of the Haqqani insurgent group. They also claim that the ISI has direct control over some of the most violent Taleban and Haqqani units. This analysis of extensive support has been corroborated by former Taleban ministers and a UN official in Kabul. The Taleban also receives funding from groups based in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. The Taleban, therefore, receives a significant level of international support, and there is no indication of this wavering.
This is the challenging situation which General Petraeus faces. His task is made all the more daunting by Barack Obama’s announcement that US forces should begin to withdraw in July 2011, just one year away. This target makes the British government’s statements about 2014 or 2015 look calm and mild by comparison. This 2011 target deadline, when set alongside the withdrawal of other NATO allies, the mixed messages coming from London, the sacking of General McChrystal and the slow progress against the Taleban so far, means that the long-term prospect of success in Afghanistan is in a precarious position. Confidence within Afghanistan, that NATO forces are committed to seeing the mission through to a successful conclusion, and confidence within NATO countries that we can still achieve a successful conclusion, has been dangerously undermined. If we are serious about succeeding in Afghanistan, rather than simply getting out as soon as possible, politicians should stop the talk of withdrawal dates and deadlines, which give encouragement to the Taleban and undermine our Afghan allies as well as the morale of our own forces. Nor, given the urgency of the challenge we face, should they rule out actually sending in additional troops if this is required as part of Petraeus’s surge strategy. Our strategy must be clearly aimed at winning this war, and not dependent on negotiating with the Taleban, who have indicated that they presently have no desire to negotiate with us or with the Afghan government. The mission in Afghanistan has been let down by divisions and incoherence in leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. Now unity and discipline is required of our politicians, if our armed forces are to be able to succeed.
Peter John Cannon is the Henry Jackson Society’s Governance, Strategy and Terrorism Section Director.
