For many Europeans, Belarus seems far away. It is a small country, one of the poorest in Europe. It is a Stalinist country, trapped in a Soviet-style regime led by Alexander Lukashenko. It is a Slavic country, viewed by some observers as little more than a quasi-autonomous appendage of the Russian Federation. Yet Belarus is not Russia. It is independent, sovereign and, since 2004, situated on the eastern frontier of an expanding and rapidly consolidating European Union (EU). It is also Europe’s last dictatorship, and a potential source of significant regional instability. With the 19th March presidential elections mired in fraud, prospects for internal unrest and repression now make Belarus’ proximity a pressing concern. Peaceful change is not just desirable, but strategically essential.
Lukashenko’s Belarus is neither an economic powerhouse nor an example of competent governance. According to the World Bank, it is one of the poorest countries in geographical Europe, with a per capita Gross National Income of only €1,725 ($2,100). Only Ukraine, Moldova and the countries of the South Caucasus score lower. Moreover, recent evidence of strong economic growth is largely an illusion. Moscow provides Minsk with cheap energy – valued between €2.5-€4 billion ($3-$5 billion) – thus underwriting the regime and distorting the domestic economy. Current growth trends would likely plunge if Russian gas subsidies were to cease. This scenario is unlikely, however, as energy dependency keeps Minsk firmly hitched to Moscow. While the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, may not admire Lukashenko, the Kremlin remains keen on retaining some leverage over one of the remaining buffers between the rodina (motherland) and the rapidly integrating global power to Russia’s west.
More importantly, Belarus is repressive. Freedom House ranks it alongside Russia and Azerbaijan as one of the last authoritarian regimes in Europe. Lukashenko’s recent repeal of constitutional prohibitions preventing the president from serving more than two terms in office only amplifies his dictatorial rule. The EU and the United States (US) routinely condemn the Belarusian authorities for these and other abuses. Belarus, in turn, routinely blocks diplomatic initiatives aimed at protecting democracy and human rights. Robert Cooper, the EU Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, and Dan Fried, the US Deputy Secretary of State for Europe, were due to meet the Belarus authorities on the 3rd February 2006, to demand that democratic standards be upheld during the 19th March presidential election. The meeting was abandoned when Minsk refused to issue the necessary visas. In response, Europe and America issued a firm joint declaration, demanding that Minsk build ‘a democratic, stable and prosperous country with strong links with the international community.’
Though necessary, this declaration is not sufficient. Lukashenko’s regime neither favours strong links with the global community, nor cares for the interests of the population it holds captive. Like all authoritarian regimes, its primary preoccupation is maintaining its own power. That character was most evident during the week before the 19th March election. Election monitors were barred from the country. Opposition leaders were threatened, beaten or arrested. Police announced plans to charge pro-democracy protesters with ‘terrorism’. Lukashenko warned the Belarusian people that a ‘colour revolution’ like those in Ukraine and Georgia would be met with violent force. ‘If there are provocations’, he declared, ‘we’ll give them such a going-over they won’t know what’s hit them.’
These are not idle threats. Ordinary Belarusians fear Lukashenko, and rightly so. He controls their work and welfare through a tightly woven network of state patronage. He dominates the media, creating a network of state-run television, radio stations and newspapers to furnish reporting favourable to the regime. He suppresses legitimate dissent, subjecting his political opponents to arrest, battery, or forced disappearances. Enough is enough. With Europe’s last dictator having coasted to victory on a wave of overt and covert coercion, it is high time for the EU and its allies to develop and implement a roadmap for peaceful change in Belarus.
The challenge is much more daunting here than elsewhere. Neither the EU nor the US possesses the same degree of political leverage in Belarus as in Ukraine or Georgia. Nor, for that matter, do most international civil society organisations or human rights defenders. Lukashenko’s effective domination of the media – including the recent imposition of Internet censorship – isolates most Belarusians from the outside world. Worse, allies in state-controlled media portray the Belarusian president as a pole of stability and the outside world as chaotic and dangerous. Absent vibrant independent mechanisms for public debate, these and other images leave the democratic opposition with few credible, alternative narratives.
The EU sought to break this information blockade by broadcasting independent media into Belarus during run up the 19th March election. With the election now over, Europe must not merely maintain that broadcasting, but amplify it. International news from Baltic, Polish and Ukrainian journalists should feature prominently, together with reporting by independent Russian journalists. Presenting perspectives from Belarus’ neighbours – including several increasingly successful EU members – will be crucial in piercing the veil of misinformation and reinforcing the notion of Europe as a safe, prosperous and democratic community. Humour will also be critical. Combined with an astute understanding of daily Belarusian life, political comedy could play a central role in developing a post-Soviet culture in which the public views leaders as servants, rather than saviours. This task poses few challenges. With his comb-like moustache, bombastic rhetoric and squeaky voice, Lukashenko is a satirist’s dream.
Diplomatic sanctions are also necessary. Having rigged the presidential elections, Lukashenko and his henchmen must be publicly and decisively censured by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, the European Commission and the European Parliament. Senior members of the Belarusian regime should be banned from travelling in the EU and other surrounding countries, many of which explicitly supported Brussels’ efforts to encourage democratic reform. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, threatened ‘restrictions’ if Minsk failed to adhere to internationally recognised standards during the presidential campaign. Lukashenko’s patent disregard for those standards leaves little room for debate. Europe should enact and enforce Ferrero-Waldner’s restrictions with vigour.
Measured economic engagement should accompany those diplomatic rebukes. It could be argued that Europe has not offered sufficient incentives to lure Minsk away from Moscow’s orbit. As Belarusian Foreign Minister, Sergei Martynov, recently observed, ‘Russia provides stable supplies of oil and gas at a good price, and access to a market of over 200 million people [in former Soviet countries]. The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy would not even give us [complete] access to the single market.’ If this is truly Minsk’s view, then Brussels should politely remind the Belarusian Foreign Minister that the EU encompasses nearly half a billion people, which form the largest and wealthiest single market in the world. Against that backdrop, strict conditionality under the Neighbourhood Policy is both patently fair and could prove highly beneficial. Though unlikely in the near-term, substantial political and economic reforms in Belarus should nonetheless prompt the immediate opening of Europe’s enormous markets and significant levels of foreign direct investment.
Although these steps could help create a more constructive political environment, they cannot resolve Belarus’ underlying pathologies. Leadership from indigenous civil society organisations remains essential, both in securing peaceful change and preserving the legitimacy of democratic processes. To those ends, a European Institute for Good Governance (EIGG) should be established to compliment the European Commission’s Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights. This institute would be similar to the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington or the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in London. Organised under the European Security Strategy, and accountable to Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EIGG would become the central agency for the pursuit of democracy promotion projects throughout the European Neighbourhood, as well as across the world. It would also coordinate with, and provide independent support for, national and non-governmental organisations engaged in similar endeavours.
The flawed Belarusian elections constitute a clear challenge to European values. Yet they also present a unique opportunity for more assertive and creative European leadership. By combining diplomatic pressure, economic incentives and a renewed commitment to indigenous civil society promotion, the EU and its member states can create the conditions necessary for peaceful yet dramatic transformation. What is more, renewed focus on Belarus offers Europe’s newest members – including Poland and the Baltic States – an important voice in shaping the tenor and thrust of EU foreign policy. The strategic and moral imperatives are mutually reinforcing: promoting good-governance abroad will only enhance European security and solidarity at home. Though Belarus may seem far away, the interest and values at stake remain intimately familiar.