The case of the Iranian nuclear scientist, Shahram Amiri, has rarely been out of the news in recent weeks, a story fuelled by radioactive proportions of speculation and intrigue, but only an atomic quantity of hard fact. Amiri recently returned to Kabul after allegedly being captured by the CIA with the apparent help of Saudi Arabia and was ‘held’ in the USA for fourteen months. It is claimed that Amiri acted as an informant to the CIA and had been for many years, regarding Iran’s nuclear programme following extensive interrogation. Iran declared that Amiri was in fact a low level expert in radioactive isotopes for medical use and therefore was a useless informant to the CIA who should be embarrassed for their misjudgement. It would not be the first time an international organisation has got it so very wrong. 

Who should really be a fiery shade of red? The CIA? Did they abduct Amiri at all? If so, have they wasted time working with a low level ‘informant’ that had no real intelligence and would it realistically have taken them  over a year to ‘release’ him? Could the CIA really have got it that wrong? Conceivably the CIA maybe embarrassed if they were double bluffed by the Iranian government who may have planted Amiri on them to keep them occupied for a while. Or perhaps Iran should be as red as the tip of a rocket lolly. Did they even know Amiri had left the country? Are they even aware as to what information, if any, has been shared and is this why they might have forced Amiri to deny his capabilities as an informant? Has Iran’s attempt to discredit Amiri as a mere expert in radioactive isotopes for medical uses failed due to Iran’s frontline statement that their need for highly enriched uranium be for cancer treatment – when in fact they have prevented the IAEA accessing their facilities due to growing suspicion.

Conflicting information from US and Iranian officials in addition to a plethora of statements by Amiri makes it difficult to surmise a true record of events, conceivably the ultimate plan of both governing powers. Whether or not Amiri was offered the five or even fifty million US dollars by the CIA, there does not seem to be any further information released on Iran’s nuclear programme to prove his worth. However, one must appreciate that whatever the relationship between Amiri and CIA, if any information was obtained as the US claims it was, it is unlikely that it will ever be released into the public domain. 

All that can be surmised is that if Amiri was an informant to the CIA whether voluntarily or not, he was naive not to protect his family first, as now, even if he did want to collect the alleged five million dollars, he will be unable to do so without raising further suspicion in Iran, unless, as suggested, he was a double agent for Iran. A serious lack of verifiable information suggests that this issue will never be fully resolved, Iran presently struggles to appear to be a credible source due to its current position in international affairs and the very nature of the CIA as a security intelligence agency, allows them to use the ‘no comment’ card when necessary. Both the USA and Iran will miss the gallows, as once again public interest will shortly move on to the next international fiasco.